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n May 16, 2006, after months of intense and divisive national 
debate, the Nigerian Senate voted down a bill that would 
have altered the country's constitution to permit President 
Olusegun Obasanjo to seek a third term in office1 . By 
asserting the supremacy of the constitution (with its two-
term limit) over the desires of President Obasanjo's supporters that the popular 
leader be permitted to run for a third term, the Senate's vote marked a watershed 
moment in Nigeria's political history. Even more important than the outcome 
itself was the fact that the conflict was resolved by the vote of a constitutionally 
empowered chamber of the legislature, rather than through violence or the 
threat of violence. This represented a major shift in how power has historically 
been exercised in the country. 
Both the outcome of President Obasanjo's third term campaign and the 
process through which it was reached are indicative of a growing trend in 
Africa whereby the formal rules of the game are beginning to matter in ways in 
which they previously have noF. Africa has traditionally been depicted in the 
scholarly and popular literatures as a place where formal institutional rules 
are largely irrelevant. Although every African country has a constitution and a 
body of laws and administrative procedures that provide formal limitations on 
how power is to be exercised, the long-held consensus among observers of 
African affairs is that these rules play 
little role in actually constraining 
behaviour. This view is reflected in the 
dominant paradigm in the study of 
Africa politics for the past thirty years 
- "personal" or "Big Man" or 
"(neo)patrimonial" rule - the 
foundational idea of which is that 
personal relationships are more 
important than formal rules and that 
a leader's decisions will always take 
precedence over the laws that those 
decisions might contradict. The 
conventional wisdom has been that, 
in Africa, rules do not shape leaders' 
behaviour; leaders' behaviour trumps 
rules3 . 
The significance of the Nigerian 
Senate's actions must be viewed 
against the backdrop of this 
entrenched understanding of how 
African politics operates. Contrary to 
depictions of African politics as "not 
beholden to formal procedures but to 
personal decisions," President 
Obasanjo was forced by the rules of 
the game (the constitution) to accept 
something other than his preferred 
outcome4 . And contrary to portrayals 
of political conduct in Africa as 
"governed by the awareness that 
constitutional rules or administrative 
regulations can, and probably ought 
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to be evaded," both supporters and 
opponents of the president's bid for 
a third term sought to achieve their 
goals by working through, rather than 
around, formal institutional 
channels5 . 
President Obasanjo's attempt to 
extend his rule was thus shaped, and 
ultimately thwarted, by precisely the 
kinds of formal institutional 
constraints on power that the 
literature on African politics has 
tended to dismiss as irrelevant. 
These institutional constraints made 
themselves felt both directly, by 
providing a mechanism for weighing 
(and, in the end rejecting) the third 
term proposal, and indirectly, by 
shaping the strategies that all of the 
major political actors in the struggle 
pursued to bring about their preferred 
resolution to the controversy. 
Our aim in this paper is to 
provide evidence that across Africa 
formal institutional rules are starting 
to constrain leaders' behavior and to 
shape political actors' strategies in 
new ways. 
We present several kinds of 
evidence to make our case. First we 
present data that we have collected 
on how every leader in sub-Saharan 
Africa since independence exited 
power. We use these data to 
document that whereas the majority 
of African leaders in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s left office via coup, 
assassination, or violent overthrow, 
the majority since the 1990 have left 
office via institutionalised means -
chiefly via voluntary resignation at the 
end of a constitutionally defined term 
or by losing an election. We then 
document the growing importance of 
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elections as a mechanism for 
selecting leaders in Africa, 
underscoring the increase in both the 
number of these contests over time 
and their competitiveness. We note, 
however, that while African elections 
are much more competitive today than 
in the past, they are still 
overwhelmingly won by incumbents. 
We therefore argue that the major 
challenge for limiting presidential 
power in Africa today is not so much 
promoting elections as making 
certain that leaders adhere to 
constitutional limits on their 
continued eligibility to contest them. 
In the third part of the paper, we 
review the region's record on this 
score, concluding that while a 
number of African leaders have 
managed to circumvent restrictions 
on seeking third terms in office, the 
manner in which they have done so 
has been through formal institutional, 
rather than extra-constitutional, 
channels. We conclude that while 
institutional rules may thus not yet 
always determine outcomes in Africa 
today, they are now consistently and 
dependably affecting the strategies 
through which those outcomes are 
reached. This represents a major 
change in how power is exercised, 
and it challenges students of African 
affairs to rethink their axiomatic 
application of "personalist" or 
"neopatrimonial" paradigms in their 
analyses of the region's politics. 
How Leaders Exit Power in 
Africa 
During its first decade after 
independence in 1960, Benin had no 
fewer than twelve heads of state, 
every one of whom was overthrown 
in a coup d'etat. This striking record 
of serial leadership change by force 
stands in complete contrast to 
Benin's record over the past ten 
years, over the course of which two 
leaders: Matthew Kerekou and 
Nicephore Soglo, have alternated in 
power following victories and defeats 
in national elections6 . While Benin 
provides perhaps the most extreme 
example of the change that has taken 
place in how leaders leave power in 
Africa, it is nonetheless indicative of 
a broader trend. 
To document this trend, we have 
collected data on how every African 
Heads of State exited power between 
independence and the end of 20057 . 
Our sample includes some 227 
leaders from 46 sub-Saharan African 
countries8 • We coded each leader's 
means of exit from office into one of 
five categories: coup/violent overthrow 
(including civil war), assassination, 
natural death, voluntary resignation, 
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How African Leaders Have Left Power, by Decade project, which codes the way Heads 
of State in every independent country 
in the world entered and exited power 
between 1875 and 2002 9 . This 
comparison, made in Figure 2, 
reveals a remarkable degree of 
convergence. With respect to how 
leaders leave power, Africa (depicted 
by the solid line) used to be truly a 
place unto itself - a place befitting 
its own theories about politics and 
power. However, by the first years of 
the current century Africa had joined 
the rest of the world. Whereas African 
leaders were two to three times more 
likely than leaders elsewhere in the 
world to leave power by violent means 
in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, they 
are equally likely - indeed, equally 
unlikely- to do so today1°. 
l)l)" 
•······ ······•·· ... 





--+-tt1tnr:1l dr-.lth \'nlnnt:lt'Y re~!JnatiCH1 or lo..,in? i>le-ctton 
~ ~ • .. ·coup no lent o\·erthrow t~r ;l~':><1~',matiOn 
and losing an election. We further 
grouped these categories into two 
broader classes of cases: those in 
which leaders left power via regular 
means (which includes natural death, 
voluntary resignation, or losing an 
election) and those in which leaders 
were removed by irregular means 
(coup/violent overthrow or 
assassination). Figure 1 presents the 
decade-by-decade averages. 
As Figure 1 makes clear, nearly 
three quarters of the African leaders 
who left power in the 1960s and 
1970s did so via coup, violent 
overthrow or assassination (as 
depicted by the dashed line). This 
dropped to just below 70 per cent in 
the 1980s and, by the 1990s, was 
surpassed by the share of those who 
left power via natural death, voluntary 
resignation, or losing an election (as 
depicted by the solid line). Between 
2000 and 2005, the share of leaders 
leaving power through irregular means 
dropped to just 19%. Thus whereas 
the modal means by which Heads of 
State in Africa left office used to be 
via coup or assassination, it is now 
via voluntary resignation, in most 
cases triggered by constitutional term 
limits (9 of the 17 cases between 
2000 and 2005). 
Another way of looking at this 
transformation is by comparing Africa 
with the rest of the world. To do this, 
we use data from the Archigos 
These trends point to the 
increasing institutionalisation of 
political power in Africa. Whereas 
political power used to change hands 
principally through violence, it now 
changes hands principally in 
accordance with institutional rules. 
:r i ,::: >·.\.:"tei!ders Leaving Power via Irregular Means, Africa vs. Rest of the World 
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Whereas leaders used to exit power 
at a time and in a way of their own -
or, quite frequently, a coup plotter's 
choosing - they now do so at a time 
and in a way dictated by a set of 
impersonal constitutional rules that 
they do not control. 
Of course, the manner in which 
Heads of State exit office is only one 
indicator of how beholden they are to 
formal constraints more generally. It 
says nothing, for example, about the 
extent to which they adhere to 
objective procedures when they 
allocate jobs, award contracts, 
enforce regulations, or exercise other 
powers of office. Nonetheless, the 
regular or irregular means through 
which a leader departs office is 
critical. For, when regular, it provides 
a set of fundamental limitations on 
how long a Head of State may stay 
in power and how those who oppose 
his leadership may seek to replace 
him. It therefore marks the first 
important step toward restraining 
power and institutionalising political 
authority more broadly. 
The Institutionalisation of 
Electoral Politics 
One of the clearest manifestations of 
the increasing institutionalisation of 
political power in Africa is the 
increasing importance of elections. 
Elections have been held in Africa 
since the independence era, albeit 
sometimes only intermittently and 
with varying degrees of contestation. 
However, both the total number of 
elections held per decade and the 
share of elections that are 
Of course, the 
manner in which 
Heads of State exit 
office is only one 
indicator of how 
beholden they are to 
formal constraints 
more generally. It 
says nothing, for 
example, about the 
extent to which they 
adhere to objective 
procedures when they 
allocate jobs, award 
contracts, enforce 
regulations, or 
exercise other powers 
of office. 
meaningfully contested has risen 
over time, particularly since the early 
1990s. Figure 3 documents this 
trend. 
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was an average of 28 elections in the 
region per decade. That number grew 
to 36 in the 1980s and to 65 in the 
1990s. With 41 elections having been 
held in Africa by the end of 2005, this 
upward trend appears to be 
continuing. This pattern, seen in the 
bars in Figure 3, is largely a product 
of two developments. First, countries 
such as Gambia and Malawi that did 
not hold elections in the immediate 
post-independence period have 
begun holding them. Second, others 
countries like Togo, which held 
sporadic elections in the 1960s and 
1970s began regularising their 
electoral processes 11 . 
Another clear pattern in Figure 
3 is that elections are increasingly 
contested (depicted in the upward 
trend in the line in Figure 3)12 . Only 2 
of the 26 presidential elections held 
in Africa in the 1960s did the 
incumbent actually face an opponent. 
The vast majority of presidential 
elections during this period were little 
more than plebiscites or grassroots 
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Head of State stood no risk of losing 
power. By the 1990s, however, over 
90 per cent of presidential elections 
were contested, and by the 2000-
2005 periods, this share had risen to 
98 per cent. This dramatic change 
reflects the growing recognition by 
African leaders that, to maintain their 
legitimacy in the eyes of both their 
own citizens and the international 
community, they must subject 
themselves to elections in which an 
opponent has at least a theoretical 
possibility of unseating them. Indeed, 
by 2005, fully 81 per cent of 
respondents surveyed in twelve 
African countries agreed that "we 
should choose our leaders in this 
country through regular, open and 
honest elections13 . 
Permitting a challenger to run 
in the election is not, however, the 
same thing as putting oneself at real 
risk of losing power. In many cases, 
African leaders who bowed to popular 
or international pressure to hold 
contested elections found ways of 
rigging them so that the contests 
never brought a meaningful risk that 
they would be unseated. That said, 
our data suggests that this is 
becoming harder to do. When we 
compare across decades the re-
election rates of presidents who 
permitted challengers to run against 
them, we find that elections in Africa 
are not only becoming more 
contested but also more competitive. 
During the entire period between 
1960 and 1990, only one African 
president lost an election. This was 
Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia, 
who was defeated by challenger 
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 196714 . 
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Since 1990, the incumbent loss rate 
has risen to a modest but 
nonetheless meaningful 14 per cent 
(incumbents lost 14 times in 100 
opportunities). African presidents 
today are thus more than twice as 
likely to lose power if they subject 
themselves to contested elections 
than they were before 1990, when the 
loss rate was just over 6 per cent ( 1 
electoral defeat out of just 16 
contested elections). 
Despite this trend of increasing 
competitiveness, however, the more 
important point to underscore is that 
African leaders who want to stay in 
power are usually able to do so, even 
if they subject themselves to 
competitive elections. Incumbent 
presidents in Africa today still win re-
election more than 85 per cent of the 
time. The advantages of incumbency 
are so great that elections alone -
even free and fair elections- are not 
enough to provide meaningful 
limitations on presidential power. The 
institutionalisation of political power 
in Africa today thus depends less on 
whether sitting presidents are willing 
to permit challengers as on whether 
they will agree to stand down (and 
forego a likely re-election) when they 
have completed the maximum 
number of terms that their country's 
constitution allows. Whereas the 
leading issue in Africa during the 
1990s with respect to constraining 
political power was whether 
incumbent leaders would open 
themselves up to competitive 
elections, the central question today 
is whether they will attempt to 
overturn constitutional limits on their 
continued eligibility to run in those 
elections, and what happens when 
they do. 
Third Term Debates 
Since 1990, more than three dozen 
African countries have adopted new 
constitutions, the vast majority of 
which have included prohibitions on 
presidents serving more than two 
terms in office. Figure 4 sorts the 
countries of the region into five 
categories depending on whether or 
not their post-1990 constitution 
provides a two-term limit on the 
presidency, whether at any point 
between 1990 and 2005 that term 
limit had been reached, whether, if 
reached, an attempt has been made 
to amend the constitution, and 
whether that attempt was 
successful15 . As the Figure shows, 
eighteen African presidents during 
this period have found themselves in 
the position of having completed two 
terms and being constitutionally 
barred from seeking re-election to a 
third 16 . These incumbents had three 
options: abide by the constitutional 
term limit and stand down, attempt 
to change the constitution to permit 
a third term, or scrap the constitution 
altogether and prolong their tenure 
through extra-constitutional means. 
The fact that no African leader has 
thus far taken this third course is an 
indication of just how much has 
changed in the region. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, it was commonplace for 
African leaders who wanted to 
perpetuate their rule simply to have 
themselves declared "Life President" 
-as Banda did in Malawi, Eyadema 
did in Togo, Mobutu did in Zaire, 
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Nguema did in Equatorial Guinea, 
Amin did in Uganda, Nkrumah did in 
Ghana, and Bokassa did in the 
Central African Republic. Today that 
option would appear to be closed. 
All eighteen presidents who 
faced term limits received strong calls 
from their supporters to find a way to 
return to power. Nine of them -
Presidents Kerekou of Benin, 
Monteiro of Cape Verde, Rawlings of 
Ghana, Moi of Kenya, Konan§ of Mali, 
Chissano of Mozambique, Trovoada 
of Sao Tome & Principe, Rene of 
Seychelles and Mkapa of Tanzania 
- resisted these appeals and 
announced that they would abide by 
their countries' constitutions and 
refrain from seeking a third term 17 . It 
is not clear whether this was 
because these leaders did not think 
they could muster the necessary 
votes to change the constitution, were 
disinclined to mount a fight against 
what would have been a concerted 
opposition, or simply believed that 
abiding by the constitution was the 
right thing to do. The answer almost 
certainly lies in a combination of 
these considerations, and it 
undoubtedly varies from case to case. 
Whatever the rationale, however, the 
outcomes in these cases run 
contrary to the assumption of the 
personal rule literature that formal 
institutional limitations do not matter. 
These nine presidents did not decide 
to forego a third term because 
stepping down was necessarily their 
most preferred option. In at least 
some - perhaps most- of the cases, 
they agreed to relinquish power 
because the constitutional prohibition 
on extending their rule raised the cost 
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of achieving their preferred outcome 
beyond a level that they were willing 
to bear. This directly challenges the 
caricature of Africa as a place where 
"abstract constitutions and formal 
institutions exist on paper, but they 
do not shape the conduct of individual 
actors, especially those in power18 • 
The nine leaders who agreed to 
step down, however, represent just 
half of the universe of sitting 
presidents who faced term limits. The 
other nine tried to change their 
respective constitutions to make a 
third term possible. Presidents 
Chiluba of Zambia, Muluzi of Malawi, 
and, as we have seen, Obasanjo of 
Nigeria were rebuffed in their efforts. 
Chiluba's attempt to secure a third 
term was undermined by a 
groundswell of public opposition from 
civil society groups and a deep split 
within his own party19 . Fifteen senior 
members of the National Executive 
Committee ofthe ruling Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
publicly opposed his bid to amend 
the constitution, and 59 MMD MPs, 
including several cabinet ministers 
and Chiluba's own Vice President, 
signed a document in which they 
pledged to block any effort to allow 
him to run for a third term. In the face 
of such concerted opposition, 
Chiluba ultimately backed down. 
Muluzi also faced strong public 
opposition to his bid for a third term. 
Even so, he very nearly succeeded 
in altering the constitution to extend 
his tenure. The amendment that 
would have permitted him to run for 
another term fell just three votes 
short of the necessary two-thirds 
majority in parliament. As discussed 
earlier, Obasanjo's bid for a third term 
was blocked by the Nigerian Senate. 
In six other cases, leaders 
facing term limits were able to change 
the constitutional provisions that 
prevented them from continuing their 
rule. Presidents Deby of Chad, Bongo 
of Gabon, Conte of Guinea, Nujoma 
of Namibia, Eyadema of Togo, and 
Museveni of Uganda all succeed in 
changing their constitutions to allow 
themselves the ability to compete for 
third terms, and all seven won their 
ensuing elections handily. In Gabon, 
Namibia, Togo, and Uganda, the 
constitution was amended by an act 
of parliament; in Guinea, the 
amendment came via a national 
referendum (which third term 
supporters won with 98 per cent of 
the vote). In Chad, the change was 
achieved via both mechanisms: a 
two-thirds parliamentary vote in favor 
of amending the constitution triggered 
a national referendum on the 
question, which carried by a two-to-
one margin. Superficially, at least, 
these cases remind us that many 
African leaders still possess the 
power to shape outcomes to suit their 
preferences, even when those 
preferences conflict with formal 
limitations on what they are legally 
permitted to do. These leaders 
wanted to stay in office but a 
constitutional rule prevented them 
from doing so, so they changed the 
constitution. Presidents De by, 
Bongo, Nujoma, and Eyadema were 
able to accomplish this by taking 
advantage of the fact that their parties 
controlled more than two thirds of the 
seats in parliament. President 
Museveni lacked the supermajority 
required to change the constitution 
but was able to use his control of 
state resources to buy the 
parliamentary votes he needed to 
pass the third term amendment. In 
contrast to the cases described 
earlier, these examples would appear 
to vindicate the view of Africa as a 
place where leaders monopolise 
political and economic power so 
completely that their preferences do, 
in fact, take precedence over the 
formal rules of the game. 
This conclusion, however, 
ignores the fact that these rulers 
decided to use their considerable 
powers to work within, rather than 
around, institutionalised channels. All 
of these leaders were probably strong 
enough to have simply voided their 
constitutions and declared 
themselves president for life. The fact 
that they felt the need to lobby for 
(and even buy) the votes to change 
the constitution demonstrate the 
extent to which the rules do matter. 
Even when the limitations that the 
rules provided were ultimately 
circumvented- as they were in these 
seven cases - the presence of the 
rules shaped the strategies that the 
leaders pursued to achieve the 
outcomes they most desired. 
The Finding that the restrictions 
on seeking a third term caused 
African leaders to alter their behavior, 
flies in the face of the conventional 
wisdom that political power in Africa 
is unconstrained by formal 
institutional rules. In 1982, Jackson 
and Rosberg wrote that "the inquiring 
student of African politics may be 
better advised to read Machiavelli or 
Hobbes than the 'constitutions,' 
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While Machiavelli 
and Hobbes will no 
doubt remain 
important sources of 
insight into African 
politics, the formal 
institutional 
constraints embodied 
in constitutions are 
beginning to shape 
behavior in Africa in 
ways that the personal 
rule paradigm would 
not have predicted. 
official plans, or party programmes 
of most African governments if he 
wishes to understand their central 
characteristics and dynamics." They 
saw "little sign that the drama of 
personal rule will soon give way to 
more settled institutional forms of 
conducting the affairs of states20 . 
Nearly 25 years later, Hyden 
maintains the same position when he 
writes that, in Africa, "the notion that 
constitutional norms and principles 
are binding on political leaders is still 
very much in doubt2 1 . Yet the 
evidence summarised here suggests 
that such a position may no longer 
accurately reflect the facts on the 
ground. While Machiavelli and 
Hobbes will no doubt remain 
important sources of insight into 
African politics, the formal 
institutional constraints embodied in 
constitutions are beginning to shape 
behavior in Africa in ways that the 
personal rule paradigm would not 
have predicted. Those who seek to 
understand the "central 
characteristics and dynamics" of 
African politics can no longer focus 
their attention purely on the 
preferences of leaders and ignore the 
rules of the game, that impose costs 
that constrain them and shape their 
actions. 
Conclusions, Cautions, and 
Future Directions 
Our main aim in this paper has been 
to present evidence to suggest that 
the well-worn personal rule paradigm 
that has been used to understand 
African politics for the past 30 years 
may need to be rethought. To make 
our case, we have highlighted the 
dramatic change that has taken place 
in the last four and a half decades in 
the way African leaders exit power: 
whereas African Heads of State used 
to relinquish power via coup or 
assassination, they now 
overwhelmingly leave office by 
voluntary resignation or by losing an 
election. We have also reviewed the 
record on how African leaders have 
responded to the constitutional term 
limits that, since the late 1990s, have 
restricted their ability to stay in office 
beyond two terms. 
We note that none of the sitting 
presidents who have faced such 
limits have responded by abolishing 
their country's constitution or seizing 
power through force, and we suggest 
that this provides evidence for the 
gradual displacement of violence by 
rules in African politics. Half of the 
leaders who faced term limits have 
stepped aside peacefully, while the 
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other half have attempted to change 
the rules to make a third term 
possible. However, even when 
attempts to amend the constitution 
have been successful (which they 
were 6 times out of 9), the very efforts 
to change the rules represent a 
decision to work within the 
institutional framework rather than to 
ignore or override it. Taken together, 
we suggest that these trends point 
to an increasing institutionalisation of 
political power. In focusing our 
attention on the growing formal 
constraints on African political 
leaders, a secondary aim has been 
to shift the emphasis of research in, 
and debates about, African politics. 
Throughout our discussion of 
changing political trends in the region, 
we have deliberately avoided using 
the word "democracy." In the past 
twenty years, much emphasis has 
been placed on categorising African 
regimes in terms of their degree of 
democracy. Such efforts, we believe, 
have diverted attention from the more 
fundamental changes that have been 
taking place in the region with respect 
to the institutionalisation of political 
power. Whether a country has formal 
democratic rules, and whether those 
rules should lead the country to best 
be characterised as a "quasi-
democracy," a "pseudo-democracy," 
or in terms of some other label is less 
important than the more basic 
question of whether or not those rules 
bind actors' behavior. 
A few cautions about our 
argument are in order. First, it is 
important not to read too much into 
the mere fact that leaders such as 
Museveni or Nujoma sought to extend 
their rule by working through 
parliament or institutional means. 
After all, the declaration of a one party 
state in Ghana (and effectively, a life 
presidency for Nkrumah) was 
achieved through a national 
referendum. Kamuzu Banda was 
named life president in Malawi in 1970 
by an act of Parliament. What 
distinguishes these earlier examples 
of (what looks superficially like) 
working through the system from the 
present examples is the answer to 
the counterfactual question: what if 
the leader had not won the 
referendum or been able to win the 
necessary supermajority in 
parliament? In the former cases, this 
question is unthinkable; in the latter, 
the question is not only a reasonable 
one to ask but also one whose answer 
is, in most cases, that the leader 
would have accepted the rebuke and 
resigned. Indeed, it was precisely the 
anticipation of such a rebuke that 
prevented leaders like Chiluba and 
Muluzi from pushing the issue further, 
and that led Obasanjo to respond to 
the Senate's vote by declaring that 
he would respect its verdict, and 
expressing his hope that the 
constitution "would be strengthened 
by the process and the exercise that 
have just been concluded22 . The roles 
played by referenda and parliaments 
in sanctifying life presidencies in the 
1960s and 1970s must be viewed as 
formalisations of the facts on the 
ground, rather than as we argued, in 
the case of the more contemporary 
examples, a means of establishing 
new facts. 
We should also not read too 
much into the frequent invocation of 
22 • NESG Economic Indicators January March 2007 
"constitutionalism" and the "rule of 
law" by third term opponents23 . While 
we do not wish to discount these 
leaders' true commitment to limited 
government, it is evident that in many 
cases their motivations lay more 
clearly in a desire to have their own 
chance at acquiring power than in 
defending abstract principles of 
constitutionalism. It is the outcomes 
we observe, and the processes 
through which they were reached, not 
the rhetoric that surrounded them, 
that we take to be indicative of the 
growing institutionalisation of political 
power in Africa. 
It is also important to 
underscore that our argument is not 
about cultural change. We do not 
claim that African leaders today have 
any less desire to stay in power than 
their predecessors. Our claim is 
simply that leaders today are more 
willing to acquiesce in institutional 
limitations on their ability to achieve 
their most preferred outcomes. 
Sometimes this acquiescence takes 
the form of standing down in the face 
of a two-term limit, and other times it 
takes the form of trying to change the 
rules so that their preferred outcome 
no longer violates them. Even then, 
today's leaders tend to try to change 
the rules through legitimate channels 
(even if in corrupt ways). 
The evidence on which we have 
based our conclusions comes from 
an analysis of general trends, and it 
goes without saying that there are 
important exceptions to the broad 
tendencies. There have been recent 
coups in the Central African Republic, 
Mauritania, and Sao Tome and 
reversals in the institutionalisation of 
political power in Gambia and 
Zimbabwe. Leaders who have ruled 
for decades remain in power in 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
Furthermore, one could make a 
compelling case that reversals are not 
out of the question in a few countries 
that fit the trends we have described 
- including Nigeria, the country we 
highlighted to start our discussion. 
So it is important to temper whatever 
optimism might rise from the evidence 
and arguments we have presented 
with the recognition that, despite the 
general trends, not every African 
country is moving in a direction of 
greater institutionalisation of political 
power, and reversals remain possible 
in some of the countries that 
currently appear to be. 
Those cautions made, we have 
presented substantial evidence to 
show that long-held assumptions 
regarding the necessarily greater 
strength of personalism than formal 
rules may no longer be the best way 
to understand African affairs. The 
frequency of coups d'etat may again 
rise, but the lines in Figure 1 will never 
re-cross. So what lens should 
researchers use to understand 
political power in the region? The idea 
that "formal rules trumps 
personalism" is probably not a 
suitable lens either, and any analysis 
of leadership in Africa should continue 
to look at leaders' personal 
motivations. Indeed, it is obvious that 
the preferences of African presidents 
shape the transfer of power, or lack 
thereof. However, we suggest that 
preferences now shape outcomes 
through a more narrow set of 
channels. These channels are 
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increasingly legitimate, in the sense 
that they are governed by impersonal 
rules. They are also increasingly 
regular, in the sense that they are less 
likely to be ignored or suspended 
while a leader's tenure continues. 
Therefore, the lens we recommend 
is one that recognises these 
channels and problematises the 
assumption that African leaders 
simply get what they want. This 
suggests a new area for research that 
looks carefully at the support 
coalitions that presidents need to 
build to win elections, as well as to 
pass crucial bills like constitutional 
amendments. • 
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